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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE LAW
I. COURT SETS NEW PROCEDURES FOR JUROR
QUESTIONS TO A WITNESS
In Day v. Kilgore' the South Carolina Supreme Court dealt with an
unusual event that can frustrate an attorney's best efforts to control the
production of evidence: direct juror questions from the jury box to a witness.
In Day the court remanded an automobile wreck case for a new trial because
the trial court allowed improper questions and requests from jurors. Writing
for a unanimous court, Justice Toal noted that although allowing a juror to
question a witness has "few benefits and great dangers," 2 the court would
continue in its refusal to apply an absolute prohibition against juror questions
to witnesses.3 However, the court outlined new and stricter procedures to
foreclose against the possibility of prejudice, thereby modifying State v.
Barrett' by narrowing the discretion given to trial judges.
In Day the plaintiff won a jury verdict for physical injuries he received
from a three-automobile collision.' During defendant's re-cross examination,
the trial judge allowed the jurors to ask the plaintiff questions while he was on
the stand. The trial judge also permitted the plaintiff's attorney to interrupt
the defendant's re-cross examination in order to lay the foundation for a
photograph of Day's car that a juror requested. The defendants appealed thd
verdict, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals, relying on Barrett, held that
reversal was required because the trial court had abused its discretion by
allowing the jury "to go on a fishing expedition and ultimately, in effect,
present evidence. "6 The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals'
result and affirmed, but used the opportunity to clarify the procedures
regarding juror questions to witnesses and to strengthen the standard for abuse
of discretion created by Barrett.
The court in Day outlined the following procedure for courts to follow
when dealing with a juror's request to ask questions of a witness during trial:
1. The jurors should immediately be sent to the jury room with
instructions not to deliberate and the entire process should be
performed out of their presence.
1. __ S.C. __, 444 S.E.2d 515 (1994).
2. Id. at __,444 S.E.2d at 517.
3. Id. at __,444 S.E.2d at 518.
4. 278 S.C. 414, 297 S.E.2d 794 (1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 160 U.S. 1045 (1983).
5. Day, _ S.C. at __, 444 S.E.2d at 516.
6. Day v. Kilgore, _ S.C. __, __, 427 S.E.2d 683, 685 (Ct. App.), aff'd, _ S.C. __,
444 S.E.2d 515 (1994).
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2. The jurors should write their questions on a sheet of paper, which
should be sent from the jury foreman through the bailiff to the trial
judge.
3. After the question is read by the trial judge into the record, the
judge should hear objections from all sides and make a ruling on
the relevance and competence of the question in accordance with
general law.
4. If the trial judge determines that the juror's question is relevant
and competent, the judge should then independently review the
question and determine "whether the question may lead the jury
out of their normal role of passive finders of fact and into the role
of advocate. "
7
The court reiterated that the trial judge is responsible for preserving the
adversarial system, and stressed that any deviation from the set procedure
would necessarily be an abuse of discretion.'
Citing Morrison v. State,9 a decision that absolutely prohibits direct juror
questions to a witness, the court outlined two major rationales for discouraging
juror questions to a witness. First, the court noted that active participation by
a jury in the fact finding process may cause them to lose their impartiality and
prematurely deliberate the case by deviating from their role as passive
listeners.10 Second, jurors are untrained in the rules of evidence and may ask
or elicit irrelevant, prejudicial, or improper evidence. 1 This presents a
difficult problem for the trial lawyer, who must either risk antagonizing the
jury by objecting to an improper question, or risk losing a possible grounds
for appeal by failing to object. 2 Further, the court stated that improper or
uncontrolled juror questions present the appellate courts with difficulty "in
measuring the effect of juror questions on the verdict." 3 Thus, the funda-
mental precepts of the adversary system, which require passive and impartial
triers of fact, impartial judges, and partisan advocates who present the
evidence, are undermined by the intertwining of roles caused by direct juror
questions to witnesses.14
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court "declined to follow the
Texas lead" in holding juror questions reversible per se despite the fact that
7. Day, _ S.C. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 518.
8. Id. at -, 444 S.E.2d at 519.
9. 845 S.W.2d 882 (rex. 1992) (en banc). Texas, Georgia, and Nebraska are the only states
that absolutely prohibit juror questions. See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
10. Day, _ S.C. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 517 (citing Morrison, 845 S.W.2d 882).
11. Id. at_, 444 S.E.2d at 517.
12. Id. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 517 (citing Morrison, 845 S.W.2d 882).
13. Id. at 444 S.E.2d at 519.
14. Id. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 517.
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it was persuaded by, and cited, the arguments of the Texas court concerning
the dangers of juror questions. 5 The court justified its rejection of the Texas
per se rule by analogizing juror questions to questions by the trial judge,
which have long been permitted. 6 The court noted that trial judges have
discretion to inquire of a witness only where they convey no opinion about any
fact, issue or other unintended prejudicial effect to the jury. However,
because trial judges are schooled in principles of law, the need for protection
against prejudice resulting from a jury is greater,1 7 justifying imposition of
the strict procedures outlined above.
The procedures created by Day do not alter the extent of the trial judge's
discretion when ruling on the relevance and materiality of a juror question;
however, they do restrict the manner in which a trial judge may exercise that
discretion. Day thus partially overrules State v. Barrett, which allowed the
trial judge considerably more discretion.
In Barrett the foreman submitted a written question to be asked of the
defendant on the stand.' The juror's question, which asked whether the gun
at issue was cocked and whether it was a single or double barrel shotgun, was
allowed by the trial judge and answered by the defendant.' The judge then
invited the jury to ask any more questions of the defendant that they had,
prompting seven more questions from the jury to the defendant.2' The
Barrett court found no prejudice and affirmed the defendant's conviction.'
Day represents a departure from Barrett in a number of respects. First,
although the Barrett court strongly discouraged direct juror questions and
noted that asking jurors to reduce their questions to writing was the "safer
practice," it did not impose any strict limits on the proper procedure for
handling such questions.' Day, on the other hand, flatly prohibits anything
other than extended review of written juror questions outside of their
presence. Second, the Barrett court noted that trial judges may ask jurors
to wait until the end of that witness' testimony, explaining that "the matter of
[their] concern will very likely be covered in due course by further questions
15. Day v. Kilgore, _ S.C. __, _,444 S.E.2d 515, 517-18 (1994) (citing Morrison, 845
S.W.2d 882).
16. Id. at 444 S.E.2d at 518.
17. Id. at _,444 S.E.2d at 518.
18. 278 S.C. 414, 297 S.E.2d 794 (1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1045 (1983),
and overruled by Day v. Kilgore, _ S.C. _, 444 S.E.2d 515 (1994).
19. Id. at 416, 297 S.E.2d at 795.
20. 1d.
21. ld.
22. Id. at 417-18, 297 S.E.2d at 795-96.
23. Barrett, 278 S.C. at 418, 297 S.E.2d at 796.
24. Day, _ S.C. at __, 444 S.E.2d at 518.
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on direct or cross-examination."'- The trial judge under Barrett could also
require witnesses to hold their questions until the end of trial.26 Under Day
a juror's wish to question a witness immediately triggers the procedures
outlined in that case 7 and requires that the jury be excused to write any
questions for submission to the judge whenever a juror expresses a desire to
ask one. 8 Third, while Barrett only suggests that trial judges show the
written questions to the attorneys and hear objections from them, 9 Day
requires submission to the attorneys, an opportunity to hear objections, and a
ruling by the judge.30 Finally, Day requires that the trial judge conduct a
more extensive review of any possible adverse impact of the juror question
than Barrett. While Barrett requires trial judges to rule on the question's
relevance, 3 which of course includes a determination of prejudice, Day goes
further to require that judges independently weigh the question to see if it,
although relevant, might conflict too much with the jury's proper role in the
adversary system as a passive judge of the facts.3 Thus, the Day court
largely mandated what had been previously suggested in Barrett 3
As noted earlier, Day relies heavily on the reasoning outlined in Morrison
v. State.3 4  In Morrison the defendant appealed his conviction of murder
because the trial judge allowed written questions from the jurors. Morrison
argued that he was prejudiced because one of the juror's questions, which was
ruled inadmissible, "tipped off" the prosecution to offer more evidence on the
issue about which the juror was concerned.35
25. Barrett, 278 S.C. at 417, 297 S.E.2d at 795.
26. Id. at 417, 297 S.E.2d at 795-96.
27. Day, _ S.C. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 518.
28. Id. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 518.
29. Barrett, 278 S.C. at 418, 297 S.E.2d at 796.
30. Day, _ S.C. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 518.
31. Barrett, 278 S.C. at 417-18, 297 S.E.2d at 796.
32. Day, _ S.C. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 518.
33. Barrett, 278 S.C. at 417-18, 297 S.E.2d at 795-96. Specifically, the court stated:
[The juror] may be advised to reduce his question to writing and pass it on to the
judge. The judge may then call the attorneys to the bench and present the request to
them. He may hear and rule on an objection to the question, on the record and out
of hearing of the jury. He may rule that the question is or is not proper to be asked.
He may ask it himself or permit one of the attorneys to ask it. The juror may be told
to wait until the testimony is concluded, and if then his question remains unanswered
may submit his request in writing to the court. If the trial judge determines that it is
relevant, competent and material, he should arrange for its presentation. By tactful
handling, the trial judge should be able to discourage questions from jurors.
Id.
34. 845 S.W.2d 882 (rex. 1992) (en bane).
35. Id. at 883. The appellant had evidently chased his victim throughout her house with a
butcher knife. The juror in the case wished to know if any of the blood found in the hallway of
the victim's home was the appellant's. The question was ruled inadmissible, but the prosecution
1995]
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The majority in Morrison began their discussion by recognizing the
fundamental importance of the adversary system to a society where individual
dignity is respected and governmental power is distrusted. 6 Texas, the
majority noted, is fiercely loyal to the proposition that where "the participants,
judge, juror, and advocate [are] each [devoted] to a single function, ... the
fairest and most efficient resolution of the dispute" is achieved.37 Texas is
so loyal to these adversary system principles that it rejects Federal Rule of
Evidence 614 and prohibits the calling of witnesses by the court. 8 The
Morrison majority found that questions to witnesses by either jurors or judges
are at odds with the adversary system and lead actors away from their proper
role.39 Just as questions by the judge may convey his opinion of the case to
the jury and influence their decision, questions by jurors may encourage
premature deliberation and unduly influence other jurors.40  Further, the
Morrison court noted that the adversary system's fundamental goal is to
protect the individual and not always to seek truth. 41 As opposed to inquisi-
torial systems, the adversary system is tolerant of acquitting even the guilty if
it means that the procedures primarily designed to protect the innocent are
upheld.42 Accordingly, the Texas court refused to follow the trend towards
emphasizing truth-seeking at the expense of adversary precepts.
The Morrison court also discussed a number of practical problems with
procedures designed to reduce the possibility of prejudice from juror
questions. First, the court noted that the lack of impartiality resulting from
juror questions is often subtle and incapable of a ready determination of its
prejudice.43 Thus, it is difficult to review these determinations on appeal and
later recalled one of the witnesses to question him about the appellant's "physical well being" on
the night of the murder. The witness testified that the appellant was not injured. Id. at 883 n.2.
36. Id. at 884-85.
37. Id. at 885.
38. Id. at 888 n.18.
39. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 887 n.12.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 884.
42. Id. at 884-85. The court noted:
Rules of evidence also operate to keep information from the jury. Legal commenta-
tors suggest that we have implemented such evidentiary barriers because we are more
appalled by the conviction of an innocent person than by the acquittal of a guilty
individual. Such barriers decrease the chance of conviction of an innocent person,
but also increase the chance that a guilty person will escape conviction.
Id. at 884 n.7 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 888. The court noted:
Mhe belief that premature impartiality can somehow be circumvented by screening
the number or manner of questions submitted assumes that such impartiality will be
so obvious as to be clearly reflected in the questions asked. We think it more likely
that juror impartiality is generally elusive of detection or measurement and for this
reason any practice which may impart impartiality should not be condoned.
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determine prejudice from the cold record. Next, the Morrison court set out
a laundry list of questions it felt were left open even when courts establish
procedures in an effort to reduce the prejudice of juror questions:
For instance, what is the permissible scope of juror questions? Should
jurors be told of the reasons for exclusion of a submitted question? Should
a witness be recalled if a juror thinks of a question after that witness has
been dismissed? If a juror's questions indicate that the juror is becoming
prematurely partial should the judge declare a mistrial? Should jurors be
allowed to question a defendant who chooses to take the stand? Especially
troublesome is the possibility that juror partiality may arise as the result of
a single question or may arise in one juror as a result of another's
questions, however impartial those questions may appear.
4
These difficulties, coupled with the tendency of any established procedures to
slow the "already sluggish and cumbersome trial process," led the Texas court
to adopt a per se rule.
The dissent in Morrison, written by Judge Benavides and cited with
approval in Day,45 agreed that a juror question "impugns adversary procedure
[by diminishing] juror passivity and [interfering with] the usual assignment of
responsibility for nonproduction of evidence," but also opined that strict
judicial control aimed at preventing "advocacy or premature commitment by
the jurors" would foreclose any detriment to the adversary system.46
Further, Judge Benavides noted that the adversary system has undesirable side
effects, including the possible obscuring of important evidence by the
courtroom skills of talented lawyers and the defeat of litigants with valid
claims who may suffer because they hire incompetent counsel.47 Under this
view, because our justice system is "intended mainly, although not exclusive-
ly, for the discovery of truth... trial judges should be allowed to implement
Id. at 888 n.15. Earlier, the court quoted Justice Frankfurterin Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S.
11 (1954): "These are subtle matters, for they concern the ingredients of what constitutesjustice.
Therefore, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Id. at 887 n.12.
44. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 888.
45. Day, _ S.C. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 518.
46. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 904 (Benavides, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 904-05. Judge Benavides wrote:
The adversary process, as any institutional process, has some undesirable side
effects. However we may relish a contest between talented advocates because we
think the outcome of trial to depend more on their respective skills than on the
relative merits of their positions, we do not pretend that the official goal of such a
contest is really to identify the better lawyer. And, while we accept the occasional
incompetence or inadvertence of attorneys which might sometimes produce avoidable
losses for litigants, both public and private, we do not think that the system is
working well when this happens.
19951
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truth-finding measures not forbidden by law so long as they do not thereby
compromise fundamental standards of the adversary system." 48  Judge
Benavides suggested that the adversary system is best preserved if jurors are
forbidden from investigating either outside the courtroom or inside whenever
one party is excluded. Furthermore, Judge Benavides would not allow jurors
to question at length or in a manner that indicates predisposition although he
noted that attorneys must be given a chance to object outside of the presence
of the jury.4'
Generally, courts in this country have adopted one of three viewpoints
regarding the issue of juror questions to a witness: a few prohibit them, most
discourage but reluctantly allow them, and others find nothing terribly wrong
with them.5" Georgia, like Texas, generally does not permit the practice."1
In State v. Williamson, for example, the Georgia court noted that "[j]urors are
not schooled in the rules of evidence which govern the posing of questions in
a trial and are likely to be personally offended" if attorneys object to their
questions. 2 The Williamson court also noted that even jurisdictions that
allow the practice do so with caution. However, Georgia courts have been
unwilling to overturn criminal convictions where defense counsel either failed
to object to the juror questions or no prejudice or harm ultimately occurred. 3
Interestingly, the court in Matchett v. State justified its finding that no harm
occurred despite a proper objection to the juror's question because the trial
judge had "properly instructed the jury as to the appropriate form of asking
questions. "54 This finding may signal a possible retreat from the flat
prohibition against juror questioning expressed in Williamsons5 and an earlier
Georgia case, Hall v. State.56
48. Id. at 905.
49. Id.
50. Jeffery S. Berkowitz, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors Be Allowed to Question
Witnesses During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 117, 128-29 (1991).
51. See Matchett v. State, 364 S.E.2d 565 (Ga. 1988); State v. Williamson, 279 S.E.2d 203
(Ga. 1981). In Matchett the trial court allowed the prosecutor to reopen redirect examination of
a state's witness after a juror indicated to the court that he wished to know how much alcohol had
been consumed by the victim and defendant at the witness's house on the day of the murder.
After this further redirect examination, the juror directly asked the witness how long the parties
were together. The trial judge sustained the defendant's objection to the question after the
witness had barely begun her answer. Matchett, 364 S.E.2d at 566-67. In Williamson the court
instructed the jurors to raise their hands if they became confused, and subsequently the judge
allowed jurors to directly ask questions of witnesses. Williamson, 279 S.E.2d at 204.
52. Williamson, 279 S.E.2d at 204 (holding, however, that because the defendant's attorney
had a twenty minute recess during which he could have objected to the questions outside the
presence of the jury, the issue was waived on appeal).
53. See Matchett, 364 S.E.2d at 567; Williamson, 279 S.E.2d at 204.
54. Matchett, 364 S.E.2d at 567.
55. Williamson, 279 S.E.2d at 204 (noting that the "practice is not permitted").
56. 244 S.E.2d 833, 837 (Ga. 1978) (remarking that because the court "found no Georgia
[Vol. 47
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Nebraska also falls among the trio of states which flatly prohibit the
questioning of witnesses by jurors. In State v. Zima" the trial judge invited
jurors to ask questions after the parties completed their examination of each
witness in a criminal trial for drinking and driving. Nebraska's supreme court
noted that the written question procedures enacted by decisions such as Barrett
not only facilitate review of the juror's question for relevance but also address
the possibility of an ittorney's reluctance to object.5" Nonetheless, the Zima
court found that these procedures fail to deal with the fundamental problem
that such questions may affect juror's impartiality, because jurors have an
"investment in obtaining answers to the questions they have posed" and may
"become advocates and possible antagonists of the witnesses." 9 The court
reiterated the incompatibility between the rules of evidence and juror
questioning, and held that the due process requirement of an impartial jury
prevented it from allowing the practice.'° Despite strong derogation of juror
questioning by the Zima court, it held, like Georgia courts, that the defendant
had waived the issue by arguing against the prosecutor's motion for a
mistrial.6
Most states have adopted a middle view which allows juror questions but
discourages or regulates them, either by procedure or discretion of the trial
judge.62 Most of these jurisdictions have used reasoning similar to that of
Day v. Kilgore and require written juror questions rather than direct juror
questioning of the witness.63 However, these states differ from South
authority [it] conclude[s] that jurors are not permitted during trial to interrogate witnesses").
57. 468 N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1991). In Zima the juror and the state's expert witness engaged
in a two-way discussion about past problems with various machines used by the police to test the
breath for alcohol. The juror contradicted the witness immediately after the witness stated that
he was not aware of such an incident, stating that she was aware of a previous incident where
a police breath analysis machine had not worked correctly. Id. at 378-79.
58. Id. at 379-80 (citing, inter alia, State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414, 297 S.E.2d 794 (1982)
(per curiam)).
59. Id. at 380.
60. Id. at 379-80.
61. Zima, 468 N.W.2d at 380. The court stated that "a party cannot silently tolerate error,
gamble on favorable results, and then complain he or she guessed wrong." Id.
62. See, e.g., People v. Cummings, 850 P.2d 1, 48 (Cal. 1993) (en bane) (requiring juror
questions be written), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1576 (1994); Stancombe v. State, 605 N.E.2d 251,
256 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that reversible error did not exist merely because the juror
questions were not writtenbeforehand); State v. Hays, 883 P.2d 1093, 1102 (Kan. 1994) (holding
that questions should be written); Commonwealth v. Urena, 632 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Mass.
1994) (requiring written questions); State v. Jumpp, 619 A.2d 602, 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.) (holding that questions should be written), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 522 (N.J. 1993). For a
list of citations to many older decisions on this issue from various jurisdictions, see Urena, 632
N.E.2d at 1203 n.2, State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Neb. 1991), and Morrison v. State,
845 S.W.2d 882, 904 n.7 (Tex. 1992) (en banc) (Benavides, J., dissenting).
63. See, e.g., Cummings, 850 P.2d at 48; Hays, 883 P.2d at 1102; Urena, 632 N.E.2d at
19951
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Carolina and each other regarding various other procedural mechanisms to be
followed. For example, Day requires that its procedure be triggered
immediately when a question is raised by a juror. 4 California, on the other
hand, allows the trial judge to let the attorneys decide whether or not, and
when, to ask the questions submitted by jurors for the witness. In People v.
Cumndngs the trial judge occasionally passed notes from the jurors to the
attorneys that asked for clarification of evidence." The California court held
that allowing the attorneys discretion in deciding whether to ask the questions
did not indicate a lack of sufficient control over the process because the judge
initially reviewed the questions before giving them to the attorneys . 6 On the
other hand, the Massachusetts decision of Commonwealth v. Urena suggests
that juror questions must wait until the end of a witness' testimony, and
requires that the parties then be allowed to reopen examination after juror
questions.67 Additionally, the judge is required to give instruction to the jury
on the opportunity to ask questions."
New Jersey follows the timing procedure set forth in Urena, but makes
no mention of a preliminary procedure or instruction.69 Regarding prelimi-
nary jury instructions, Indiana courts hold that while a trial judge may refuse
to instruct a jury about the opportunity to ask questions, it is error for the trial
judge to instruct a jury that questions are not permitted.7" Several appellate
courts have not granted relief when their suggested procedures are violated
despite the strict tone of their opinions.71
1206; Jumpp, 619 A.2d at 611. But see Stancombe, 605 N.E.2d at 254-55; State v. Howard, 360
S.E.2d 790, 794-95 (N.C. 1987); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1144-45 (Utah 1989). In
Cunmings the witness testified he recognized the defendant Gay after a juror passed a note to the
judge suggesting, "why no one tell Gay to remove his glasses (sic)." The witness had previously
testified that Gay did not look like the man he identified at the lineup. Cummings, 850 P.2d at
47. In Urena the jurors asked direct questions to the defendant as well as a prosecution witness.
All of the testimony given in response to the questions "merely repeated or clarified testimony
already given by the witness." Urena, 632 N.E.2d at 1202. In Jumpp the jurors asked both
directly and through the judge whether the defendanthad given a reason for "turning himself in."
Jumpp, 619 A.2d at 609.
64. Day v. Kilgore, _ S.C. _, 414 S.E.2d 515, 518 (1994).
65. Cummings, 850 P.2d at 46.
66. Id. at 48.
67. Urena, 632 N.E.2d at 1206.
68. Id.
69. See Jumpp, 619 A.2d at 611.
70. Stancombe v. State, 605 N.E.2d 251, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Cherry v. State,
280 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. 1972)).
71. See, e.g., Urena, 632 N.E.2d at 1205; Jumpp, 619 A.2d at 612; cf. Day, _ S.C. at
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Federal courts have generally agreed with those states that reluctantly
allow juror questions to a witness.72 Of these federal decisions, DeBenedetto
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.73 provides a thorough discussion of the
dangers of juror questioning and has been cited in a number of state cases,
including Day v. Kilgore.74 DeBenedetto is interesting in that it advances the
argument that in most trials one or two jurors dominate the rest.7' There-
fore, the DeBenedetto court argues, answers to questions propounded by jurors
will "take on a stronger significance" than those developed in the "normal
adversarial way." 76  On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit argued in United
States v. Callahan77 that occasional juror questions make "good common
sense" whenever a juror is unclear about the evidence, because attorneys
become so familiar with a case that they may gloss over issues the jury finds
complicated.78
As the above analysis demonstrates, courts have adopted widely disparate
approaches to the issue of questions by a juror. The method set out by the
court in Day v. Kilgore represents a reasonable solution to a difficult problem
and is consistent with the majority view. Empirical studies have shown that
the primary benefit gained from juror questions is "eliminating a juror's
dissatisfaction with the trial process, [rather] than ... discovering intentional-
ly concealed or previously unconsidered facts. "79 If this is true, then juror
questions should remain a rare tool to be used only in the most complicated
of trials. One potential shortcoming of Day v. Kilgore is that it may have
removed too much discretion from the trial judge in deciding when questions
shall be taken and answered. By requiring that the procedure be triggered
immediately upon submission of a question, Day may lead to unneeded delay
if juror questions become frequent at trial.
S. Creighton Waters
72. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 914 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1123 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005 (1990); United States
v. Land, 877 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 884 (1989); DeBenedetto v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1985).
73. DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515-17. InDeBenedetto the trial judge allowed jurors to orally
direct their questions to him. He would allow the questions if he thought they were proper after
objection by the attorneys. Id. at 515.
74. Day v. Kilgore, _ S.C. _, _, 444 S.E.2d 515, 518 (1994).
75. DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 517.
76. Id.
77. United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979).
78. Id. at 1086. In Callahan the jurors for a tax evasion case asked when the Internal Revenue
Service first made the defendant aware that he was being investigated. Id.
79. Berkowitz, supra note 50, at 129.
1995]
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II. CODEFENDANT'S CONFESSION THAT IMPLICATES DEFENDANT
BY INFERENCE AND POST-HYPNOTIC TESTIMONY HELD ADMISSIBLE
In State v. Evans' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a
non-testifying codefendant's confession is admissible in a joint trial even if the
admission implies the guilt of the defendant when linked with other properly
admitted evidence; only direct statements about the defendant must be redacted
before admission.2 The court also held that post-hypnotic testimony by a
witness is admissible under certain conditions and established guidelines for
judges to follow in determining admissibility.3
Evans involved the prosecution of a hit and run driver, Jerry Evans, in
connection with an accident in which four children walking on the side of a
road were struck by a truck. Two of the children were killed. The State also
prosecuted a passenger, Victor Altman, for misprision of felony.4 Evans and
Altman were tried in a joint trial. The State never located the truck, but
witnesses testified that Evans owned a truck that fit the description. Also, a
witness testified that he saw Evans driving the truck forty minutes after the
accident when Evans and Altman pulled into Evans' driveway and that the
truck appeared to be damaged and had red "paint" on the damaged area.5
A witness for the State testified that Altman confessed that he was
involved in the accident, but stated, "I wasn't driving anyway." A second
critical witness for the State was the victims' grandfather, who was with the
children at the time of the accident. The grandfather was hypnotized by police
a couple of hours after the incident to help him remember the truck and the
driver more clearly. He testified about the events he observed before and after
the truck hit the children and gave a description of the truck.6
Evans was convicted of two counts each of manslaughter, leaving the
scene of an accident involving death, and leaving the scene of an accident
involving personal injury.7 Evans appealed his conviction to the South
Carolina Supreme Court, alleging several errors in the admission of evidence
at trial. Evans claimed, inter alia, that his codefendant's confession and the
grandfather's post-hypnotic testimony were erroneously admitted.8 In a
1. __ S.C. __, 450 S.E.2d 47 (1994).
2. Id. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 50.
3. Id. at ,450 S.E.2d at 51.
4. Misprision of felony is "[t]he offense of concealing a felony committed by another, but
without such previous concert with or subsequent assistance to the felon as would make the party
concealing an accessory before or after the fact." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1000 (6th ed.
1990).
5. Evans, _ S.C. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 49.
6. Id. at ,450 S.E.2d at 49.
7. Id. at _,450 S.E.2d at 49.
8. Evans also challenged the admission of expert testimony based on hypothetical facts, id.
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four-to-one decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Evans'
arguments and affirmed the conviction.
The court first considered Evans' claim that the admission of Altman's
confession violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 9 In
Bruton v. United States'° the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated at a joint trial
by the admission of a non-testifying codefendant's statement that expressly
inculpated the defendant, even though a limiting instruction was given."
Evans urged the court to find that a Bruton violation occurred because,
although all express references to him had been redacted, the statement, "I
wasn't driving anyway," clearly implicated him. Evans argued that because it
was a joint trial, this implication allowed the jury to improperly infer that
Evans was the driver, even without other evidence. Because Altman did not
testify and could not be cross-examined, according to Evans the admission of
the testimony violated Bruton and the Confrontation Clause.' 2
The court declined to adopt Evans' extension of Bruton. Instead, relying
on Richardson v. Marsh 3 the court found that no Confrontation Clause
violation occurred because the non-testifying codefendant's confession
contained no direct reference expressly inculpating the defendant. 14 The court
found that the statement did not incriminate Evans "on its face," although it
did point to him as the driver of the truck by implication when connected with
other properly admitted evidence. According to the court, because Altman's
statement standing alone did not connect Evans to the crime, its admission did
not violate Bruton. 5
Unlike in Evans, the trial judge in Richardson instructed the jury not to
hold the codefendant's confession against the defendant. According to the
Court in Richardson, this instruction prevented the jury from drawing
impermissible inferences from the confession and protected the defendant's
at _, 450 S.E.2d at 51-52; the admission of testimony by a police investigator for lack of
personal knowledge, id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 52; and the exclusion of potentially exculpatory
statements made by a fellow inmate, id. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 52. The supreme court upheld the
lower court's rulings on these three issues.
9. The Sixth Amendment provides in part that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . ." U.S. CONs'r. amend.
VI.
10. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
11. Id.
12. Evans, - S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 49-50.
13. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
14. Evans, _ S.C. at , 450 S.E.2d at 50; accord Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211 (holding
that admission of an inferentially incriminating codefendant's confessionwhich is redacted of any
direct reference to the defendant does not violate the Confrontation Clause if a proper limiting
instruction is given).
15. Evans, __ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 50.
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confrontation rights. 6 Although the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted
the Richardson rationale, it did not find the lack of a limiting instruction in
this case troubling. Rather, the court stated that because Evans did not request
a limiting instruction, nor argue that the failure to provide a limiting
instruction was error, these arguments had been waived.'
7
The dissent in Evans disagreed with the majority on this issue. First, the
dissent found the redaction of the codefendant's confession incomplete because
the statement still indicated the presence of a more culpable individual, and it
was a clear reference to Evans without the use of other evidence.'" Second,
the dissent objected to the majority's disregard of the importance of a limiting
instruction.' 9 According to the dissent, Evans did not have to request a
limiting instruction in order to preserve the issue for appeal because once the
trial judge had refused to redact the inferential portion of the statement, a
request for a limiting instruction would have been futile."
The second issue on appeal was Evans' claim that the grandfather's post-
hypnotic testimony about the description of the truck was per se inadmissible
under State v. Pierce,2 or in the alternative, that the admission of this
testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. The court rejected both
theories.'
Pierce answered the question of whether persons present during the
hypnosis of a witness may testify as to the results of the examination. The
court held that "testimony as to the results of the hypnotic examination is not
admissible if offered for the truth of the matter asserted. "23 The Evans court
noted that Pierce is limited in application to testimony of persons other than
the declarant.u In Pierce, the defendant proffered the testimony of a
hypnotist who would testify about what happened in the examination.' Here,
however, because the grandfather was the declarant, he was free to testify
about his recollection of the events leading up to the tragedy and the
16. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208 n.3.
17. Evans, _ S.C. at_ n.1,450 S.E.2d at 50 n.1 (citing State v. Hoffman, _ S.C. __,
440 S.E.2d 869 (1994)).
18. Id. at_, 450 S.E.2d at 53 (Finney, J., dissenting); cf. State v. LaBarge, 275 S.C. 168,
170-71, 268 S.E.2d 278, 280 (1980) (holding that the substitution of a fictitious name in place
of a defendant's name in a statement by a codefendant was unacceptable under Bruton).
19. Evans, __ S.C. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 53.
20. Id. at _ n.1, 450 S.E.2d at 53 n.1 (citing State v. Bryant, __ S.C. __, 447 S.E.2d
852 (1994) (holding that when a judge overrules an objection to questioning, defense counsel need
not move to strike in order to preserve the issue for appeal)).
21. 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
22. Evans, __ S.C. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 51.
23. Pierce, 263 S.C. at 30, 207 S.E.2d at 418.
24. Evans, __ S.C. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 50.
25. Pierce, 263 S.C. at 30, 207 S.E.2d at 417-18.
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description of the truck. Thus, the court concluded that while Pierce precludes
witnesses who observed the hypnosis from testifying about what the declarant
says during the examination, it does not prohibit the declarant himself from
testifying.
26
The court then analyzed the use of post-hypnotic testimony under the
Confrontation Clause. Noting that this issue was novel in South Carolina, the
court considered the views that other jurisdictions have adopted in dealing with
hypnotically-refreshed testimony of a witness.'7  The court had several
options available in deciding this question. Although the United States
Supreme Court has held that a defendant's post-hypnotic testimony is not per
se inadmissible because it would violate the defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights," it has not yet decided whether hypnotically-refreshed testimony of
a witness should be admissible and under what circumstances admissibility is
acceptable.
Some states have adopted the position that post-hypnotic testimony is per
se inadmissible. 29 Other states allow admission of post-hypnotic testimony
where the hypnotic session is conducted in compliance with certain procedural
safeguards to ensure that the hypnosis was a reasonably reliable means of
restoring the witness's memory.30 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
adopted an alternative approach, requiring that the trial judge determine the
admissibility of this testimony by evaluating its reliability on a case-by-case
basis.3" Finally, some jurisdictions have adopted a per se admissibility rule
32
26. Evans, - S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 50.
27. Id. at_, 450 S.E.2d at 50-51.
28. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
29. E.g., State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1981) (en banc); People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d
1354 (Cal.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
30. E.g., State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 96-97 (N.J. 1981) (listing specific safeguards that the
proponent of the testimony must establish by clear and convincing evidence: the hypnosis is
administered by a psychiatrist or psychologist with hypnosis experience; the hypnotist is
independent of the prosecutor, the defense and the investigation; all information given to the
hypnotist is recorded so that it can be determined what the hypnotist could have communicated
to the witness directly or through suggestion; the witness's recollection of events is recorded prior
to hypnosis; all hypnotic sessions are recorded; and only the hypnotist and the witness should be
present during all phases of the hypnotic session); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); Clay v. Vose, 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1022 (1986).
31. E.g., McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944 (1987);
Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that hypnotically-refreshed testimony
may be admissible, but in order to protect a defendant from its dangers, the in court testimony
must be shown to be independent of the dangers associated with hypnosis).
32. E.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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but allow the hypnosis to be a factor affecting the credibility of the witness's
testimony.3
The court rejected the methodology proposed by Evans: that the
admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony turn on an evaluation of the
procedures used in the hypnotic session. Instead, the court held that a
witness's post-hypnotic testimony is admissible when: "1) the witness's trial
testimony was 'generally consistent' with pre-hypnotic statements, 2) consider-
able circumstantial evidence corroborates the witness's post-hypnotic
testimony, and 3) the witness's responses to examination by counsel 'generally
were not automatic responses of a preconditioned mental process. ' "" The
court did not agree that procedural safeguards were determinative of the
reliability of the testimony;35 it therefore declined to include these safeguards
in its test. 6 The court also specified that these determinations should be made
in camera and if the testimony is found to be admissible, questions of
credibility of the witness may then be raised before the jury.37
After reviewing the record, the court found that the hypnotically-refreshed
testimony of the grandfather was admissible, even though no record of the
grandfather's statement was made before the hypnosis and procedural
safeguards to ensure reliability were not strictly followed. 8 According to the
court, the grandfather's post-hypnotic recollection was very similar to his pre-
hypnotic recollection. His post-hypnotic testimony was corroborated by
physical evidence found at the scene of the accident and the testimony of other
witnesses. Lastly, his uncertain responses demonstrated a lack of a precondi-
tioned mental process.39
By holding that a non-testifying codefendant's confession is admissible at
a joint trial even if the confession inferentially incriminates the defendant when
linked with other evidence, the South Carolina Supreme Court has potentially
complicated matters for joint criminal defendants. After Evans, the best a
defendant in a joint trial can hope for is redaction of all express references and
a limiting instruction. In holding that a witness's hypnotically-refreshed
testimony is admissible and does not violate the defendant's confrontation
rights if, after an in camera review, the trial judge finds that the testimony
33. See Awkard, 597 F.2d at 669.
34. Evans, - S.C. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 51 (citing McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951,
959-61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944 (1987)).
35. "The three testimonial dangers associated with hypnosis are suggestibility, confabulation,
and memory hardening." Id. at _ n.3, 450 S.E.2d at 51 n.3. For a full discussion of the
dangers posed by post-hypnotic testimony, see Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 439-40 (4th
Cir. 1986).
36. Evans, _ S.C. at _ & n.5, 450 S.E.2d at 51 & n.5.
37. Id. at __,450 S.E.2d at 51.
38. Id. at __, 450 S.E.2d at51, 54.
39. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 51.
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qualifies under guidelines developed by the court, the court has embraced the
approach taken by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Nancy Hobbs
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